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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE CITIZENS BANK, a State
chartered bank corporation,
Plaintiff Respondent,

v.

Case No. 18185

THE ELKS BUILDING, N. V., a
Nether lands Antilles
Corporation,
Defendant Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an action for declaratory relief brought by the PlaintiffRespondent, The Citizens Bank, as a secured party lender against the DefendantAppellant, as Lessor, to determine the priority of the parties to certain personal
property of a tenant upon premises of the Defendant-Appellant which was
pledged as security for a loan from the Plaintiff-Respondent.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

Upon a Stipulation of Facts the parties brought cross motions for
summary judgment.

Based upon the Stipulation of Facts and arguments of

counsel, the lower court granted Plaintiff-Respondent's motion for summary
judgment and denied Def endant-Applellant's motion for summary judgment.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the lower court
affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Food Innovations Systems, Inc. is a Utah Corporation doing business
under the assumed name of Pouches, Inc.

As Pouches, Inc., the Corporation

operated two restaurants in Salt Lake City. One of the restaurants was located
in the Elks Building, in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Pouches, Inc. defaulted in it's lease agreement with the Elks
Building by failing to make payment for rent due November 15, 1980. (R.23)
On December 8, 1980,

Pouches, Inc. was served with a Notice from the

Defendant-Appellant that if payment of the delinquent rent was not made by
January 8, 1981, the Defendant-Appellant would commence legal proceedings
to recover the delinquent rent. (R.23)
Pouches, Inc. failed to make the payment on January 8, 1981, as
demanded, but the Defendant-Appellant did not commence legal proceedings
as threatened in the Notice until April 9, 1981. At no time during the lease
2
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period did the Defendant-Appellant terminate the lease with Pouches, Inc. nor
did the Defendant-Appellant attempt to rel et the premises to another tenant.
(R.9) On or about March 18, 1981, Pouches, Inc. made application for an SBA
loan from The Citizens Bank in the amount of seventy thousand dollars
($70,000.00).
The Citizens Bank approved the loan application, and in turn, submitted the
loan application to the SBA for approval. (R. 9) The SBA approval was received
March 24, 1981. (R.9)

On April 7, the loan was made to Pouches, Inc. and

proceeds disbursed on April 7, 1981. (R.9) The obligation of Pouches, Inc. was
evidenced by a promissory note in the amount of $70,000.00 and was secured by
a security interest in all machinery, equipment, furniture and fixtures

owned

·or thereafter acquired and in proceeds thereof owned by Food Inovations
Systems, dba Pouches, Inc. (R.35)

The Plaintiff-Respondent

perfected it's

security interest by filing. a financing statement on April 7, 1981. (R.36) As
of that date, the Plaintiff-Respondent held a perfected security interest in all
of the personal property of Pouches_, Inc. located at the Elks Building. (R.35,36)
Two days after the Plaintiff-Respondent obtained its perfected
security interest in the equipment at the Elks Building, the Defendant-Appellant
filed a complaint against Pouches, Inc., under which the Defendant-Appellant
elected to pursue it's statutory lessor's lien right. (R.10)

Service of Process

was not obtained until some time quring the summer of 1981 and on August
28, 1981 a judgment by default was obtained upon Defendant-Appellant's
statutory lessor's lien right.
Thereafter, because of the small sums involved, the parties agreed
to have their competing claims determined by summary judgment baseq upon
a Stipulation of Facts prepared by the parties jointly, and the parties stipulated
that all documents attached to the Stipulation and Exhibits be admissable to
3
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determine the issues raised i~ the pleadings, and further stipulated that the
court should interpret all exhibits according to their terms, and should enter
judgment on all issues raised in the pleadings based upon the facts of the case
as set forth in the Stipulation and Exhibits. (R.6,7)

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN FOLLOWING
THE UTAH STATUTE WHICH PROVIDES THAT ALL
LESSOR'S LIEN RIGHTS ARE SUBORDINATE TO
PERFECTED SECURITY INTERESTS.

The Defendant-Appellant argues that it's lessor's lien right attached prior
in time to perfection of the Plaintiff-Respondent's security interest and
therefore Defendant-Appellant claims that its statutory lessor's lien is prior
in right to Plaintiff-Respondent's perfected security interest.

The trial court

rejected Defendant-Appellant's argument because the argument is contrary to
the express priority provisions· set forth in the Utah Code Annotated.
The priority to be given lessor's liens, as a class, is set forth in Utah
Code Annotated, Section 38-3-2 (1953) (amended 1977). This Section provides:
The lien provided for in this chapter shall be
pref erred to all other liens or claims except claims for
taxes and liens of mechanics under chapter 1 of this
title, perfected security interests, and claims of
employees for wages which are· preferred by law;
provided, that when a lessee shall be adjudicated a
bankrupt, or shall make an assignment for the benefit
of creditors, or when his property shall be purt into the
possession of a receiver, the lien herein provided for
shall be limited to the rent for ninety (90) days prior
thereto (emphasis added)
This section establishes priority on the basis of the type of lien held rather
than

the time when a particular lien is acquired. Issues between competing
4
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I~

liens as to which lien was acquired first in time woUld only be relevant in
determining competing claims between liens of the same class.

The issue of

first in time is irrelevant when all liens of one class are subordinated to all
liens of another class.

Annot., 99 A.L.R. 3d 1006 (1980).

Ignoring the Utah Statute, the Defendant-Appellant relies on two decisions
from the Supreme Court of New Mexico interpreting New Mexico law i.e.,
Chessport Newarks, Inc. v. Solie, 522 P .2d 812 (N .M. 197 4) and National
Investment Trust v. Thrift National Bank, 543 P.2d 482 (N.M. 1975).

The

Defendant-Appellant failed to acknowledge that New Mexico has no statutory
provision which covers priorities between the lessor's lien and a perfected
security interest as does Utah. In the absense of an absolute rule of perfection
such as that set forth in the Utah Code, the New Mexico court ruled that
priority was based on the first interest to be perfected.
In addition, the Defendant-Appellant failed to make the distinction between
attachment of the landlord's lien and the method and time in which that lien
must be perfected. The Code provides that a lessor shall have a lien for rent
due U{>On all non-ex em pt property of the tenant, brought or kept upon the
leased premises only so long as the tenant shall occupy the premises and for
30 days thereafter. U.C.A. Section 38-3-1 (1953). This provision provides for
attachment of the lessor's lien when property of the tenant is brought on the
premises, but the lien will not be perfected and will be lost if the lessor does
not take the required actions to perfect the lien within 30 days after the
tenant leaves the premises.

The Code provides that before the lessor may

take the property of the tenant, the lessor is required to file a complaint and
only after the filing of a complaint may a writ of attachment issue in aid of
the lessor's lien.

U.C.A. 38-3-3,-4 (1953).

Upon the filing of the complaint

by the lessor, with a supporting affidavit and bond, it is the duty of the court
5
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to issue a writ of attachment and to make· a determination of the priorities
of the claims, liens and security interests in the property of the tenant. U.C.A.
38-3-5 (1953) (amended 1977); Freeway Park Building, Inc. v. Western States
Wholesale Supply, 22 Utah. 2d 266, 451 P .2d 778 (1969).
According to the facts before the Court, the tenant ceased to occupy
the

premise~

on December 8, 1980, and therefore the lessor's lien which had

attached to the property had to be perfected or would be lost by January 8,
1981. The undisputed fact is that no complaint was filed by the DefendantAppellant until more than four months after the tenant ceased to occupy the
premises, and never did the lessor seek writ of attachment or determination
of the priorities of competing claims in the property of the tenant.
Therefore, in view of the statute and the actions of the DefendantAppellant, the lower court was correct in rejecting the argument that the
lessor's statutory lien was prior in right to the Plaintiff-Respondent's perfected
security interest.

POINT II
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN
RULING THAT THE REAL PROPERTY
LEASE AGREEMENT DID NOT CREATE A
SECURITY INTEREST IN FAVOR OF THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

The Plaintiff-Respondent acknowledges that the lease default provision
expressly authorized the landlord to re-enter the premises, preserve his statutory
lien right by taking possession of the personal property on the premises and
reletting the premises for the account of the tenant.
However the Plaintiff-Respondent and the lower court rejected the
Defendant-Appellant's claim that the default provisions of the real property
lease agreement should also be construed as a security agreement which granted
6
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the Defendant-Appellant a security interest in the personal property of Pouches,
Inc.
The Defendant-Appellant seeks to base its claim on the Default and
Remedies section of the lease, Paragraph 25, which provides in part:
In the event of any such material default or breach
by Tenant, Landlord may at any time thereafter, with
or without notice or demand, without limiting L:andlord
in the exercise of any other right or remedy which
Landlord may have by reason of such default or breach:
a. without terminating this lease, may r~enter
the premises, with or without process of law, and take
possession of the same and of all equipment and fixtures
therein, and thereafter relet the premises or any part
thereof for the account of Tenant for such terms and
upon such conditions as Landlord may deem proper; ••••
(R.20)
The Plaintiff-Respondent does not contend that a landlord and tenant could
not agree to have a real property lease also contain provisions of a security
agreement, creating a security interest in personal property of the tenant.

~

e.g., Foster v. Hamblin 405 F .2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1969) (A security interest was
intended by the parties where the agreement provided, "All of lessee's mining
machinery and equipment upon said premises shall be subject to a lien to
secure unto lessors payment of all rental ••• " and the landlord filed a financing
statement in support of the security interest.); In re King Furniture City, Inc.,
240 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1965) (A security interest was intended by the
parties to an agreement providing, "to secure payment of all rent due ••• tenant
gives a landlord an express contract lien ..• " and the landlord filed a financing
statement in support of its security interest).

In this case there is no express

language creating a security interest in favor of the landlord at the time the
lease agreement was executed and the conduct of the parties illustrates that
the landlord did not assume it had a security interest until after learning of
the secured party status of the Plaintiff-Respondent.
Rejection of the Def endant-AppeUfnt's claim is justified by a review the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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historical development of the tenant account default remedy relied upon by
the Defendant-Appellant, the express language of the default remedy and the
conduct of the Defendant-Appellant.
The tenant account default remedy was developed in response to a
particular problem encountered by lessors in acting upon to the default of
tenants.

Historically, when a tenant defaulted under a lease agreement a

lessor was exposed to the potential danger· that his re-entry into or reletting
of the premises, prior to the expiration of the term of the lease, could be
construed as an acceptance of a surrender of the premises by the tenant. The
legal effect of such surrender was to effect the termination of the lease· and
release the tenant from further obligations to pay rent.
Thompson, Real Property 3A, Section 1342-48 (1959).

See generally, G.
In response to this

problem lessors began inserting a provision which would permit them, without
terminating the lease, to re-enter the premises and take control of the premises
and property, and to rel et the premises for the account of the tenant until
the landlord had been made whole from the default of the tenant.

See

generally, C. Berger, Land Ownership and Use, 2ed. 433-40 (1975). The default
provision in this lease is simply a statement of the· tenant· account theory
which protects the lessor from the claim that he has accepted a surrender of
the premises and forfeited his lessor's lien right.
The language of the lease agreement also indicates that the parties to
the agreement did not intend to create a security interest in favor of the
landlord.

First, under the lease, the interest of the lessor in the personal

property of the tenant arose only after the default of the tenant and existed
only so long as the property remained on the premises, which is exactly the
interest recognized by the statutory lessor's lien.

However, if a security

interest were to attach to the personal property of the tenant, that interest
8
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woUld follow- the property whether the property were located on the leased
premises or located elsewhere.

The lease provision only repeats the interest

recognized by the statutory lessor's lien but does not expand the lessor's
interest to that of a secured party under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.

Second, the right of the lessor to take possession of the property is

coupled with the landlord's obligation to relet the premises for the account
of the tenant. Nowhere in the lease provision is the right granted the landlord
to make a public or private sale without legal process, as he could do, if he
were a secured party creditor.

Finally, there is no representation that the

personal property of the tenant was free of encumbrances nor is there a
covenant that the property will remain unencumbered during the term of the
lease.

Both of these issues are fundamental concerns of parties to security

agreements.
The strongest evidence that the claimed security interest was an afterthe-fact creation of the Defandant-Appellant is the conduct of the DefendantAppellailt.

First, upon the default of Pouches, Inc., the Defendant-Appellant

did not avail itself of the remedy to re-enter the premises, take possession
of the

per~onal

_property and relet the premises for the account of the tenant.

As the Defendant-Appellant admitted, at no time during the lease period did
it terminate the lease or attempt to relet the premises to another tenant.
The Defendant-Appellant did pursue its only avenue to acquire the property
of the tenant which was the action on the statutory lessor's lien.
Second, if landlord had a security interest in the personal property of the
tenant, the landlord would have taken immediate steps to perfect its security
interest by filing a financing statement rather than wait to perfect after the
tenant was in default.

In this case the landlord did nothing which could be

claimed as perfection of its alleged security interest until after default by
9
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the tenant.
Third, if the lease agreement were also a security agreement creating a
security interest in favor of the Defendant-Appellant, ~pon the default of
Pouches, Inc.

Defendant-Appellant would have had the right under Article 9

of the Uniform Commercial Code to make a public or private sale of the
personal property without judicial proceedings.

No such attempt was ever

made by the Defendant-Appellant because the Def endant-Appell~nt knew it
had no secured party status. After the default of p_ouches, Inc., the DefendantAppellant elected to file a complaint against the tenant on the theory of a
statutory lessor's lien only. At no time prior to learning of the secured party
status of the Plaintiff-Respondent was there a claim that the lease agreement
operated as a security agreement creating a security interest in favor of the
Defendant-Appellent.

The only consistent explanation of the Defendant-

A.ppellant's conduct is that the lease parties did not intend the lease agreement
to create a security interest in favor of the landlord, and the lease was not
drafted to provide a security interest in favor of the landlord.

POINT III
EVEN IF ALL FACTS OF THE CASE ARE
VIEWED IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE
TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IB BOUND BY
ITS
ELECTION
TO
PURSUE
THE
STATUTORY LIEN.

As noted previously, after Pouches, Inc. defaulted under the lease
agreement, the Defendant-Appellant elected to

pursue judgment against

Pouches, Inc. on the basis of the statutory lessor's lien. (R.98,46-47)

such

action on the part of the Defendant-Appellant constituted an election of its

10
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remedy against Pouches, Inc. for default under the lease agreement.

25 ..\m.

Jur. 2d, Election Of Remedies, Sections 7 and 19; Royal Resourses, Inc. v.
Gibralter Financial Corp., 603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1979); Cook v. CoveyBallard Motor Co., 69 Utah 161, 253 P. 196 (Utah 1927).
Election of Remedies is an equitable doctrine established to do justice
between the parties. Royal Resourses, Inc. v. Gibralter Financial Corp., supra.
The defense of election of remedies must be raised by way of answer, motion
or demand so as to put the issue before the trial court. id. at 796. The issue
of the election of remedies was raised by the trial court during oral argument
on the cross motions for summary judgment. (R.98) In relevant part the record
states:
(Counsel for Defendant-Appellant Ms. Curry): "So whether or
not this court finds that the (Defendant-Appellant) had a statutory
lien or a contractual lien, we believe we have shown that the statutory
lien attached upon the property getting onto the premises that was
the latest point in time, and it is not subject to Article 9 because
there was no perfected security interest at the time. If the court
finds we have a contractual lien, then we do come within the ambit
and we perfected our security interest by taking possession some three
months before the (Plaintiff-Respondent) did."
Now, the (Plaintiff-Respondent) has arguedit.

THE COURT: Now, you read to me you could take possession of
Then what does the lease provide?
MS. CURRY: Well, it says that the landlord may pursue
any and all remedies it has at law.
THE COURT:

Tell me what remedy you pursue.

MS. CURRY:

We pursue the· statutory lien eventually.

THE COURT:

All right.

The Defendant-Appellant is bound by the election made in the proceedings
against Pouches, Inc. under the holding in Brigham City Sand and Gravel v.
Machinery Center, Inc, 613 P.2d 510 (Utah 1980).
stored equipment with the first Defendant.

In that case the Plaintiff

The first Defendant in turn sold

11
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the equipment to the second Defendant. The Plaintiff brought an action agains
both Defendants for money damages or return of the property.

Prior to tria

the Plaintiff and the first Defendant entered into a settlement, but the Plaintif:
expressly reserved all rights against the second Defendant.

In affirming thE

ruling of the trial court, this Court noted that it was the f allure of thE
Plaintiff to use reasonable diligence to protect its interest in the

propert~

that provided the foundation for the events which resulted in the seconc
Defendant's intervening interest.

Since the second Defendant derived

it~

interest in the property from the first Defendant this Court held that thE
second Defendant could claim the benefit of the election made by the Plaintiff
with the first Defendant. id. at 512.
The

controlling facts of Brigham City Sand and Gravel v.

Center, Inc., supra, are present in this case.

Machiner~

Here the Defendant-Appellant

failed to use reasonable diligence to pursue its remedy against Pouches, Inc.,
and during that delay Plaintiff-Respondent acquired its security interest in the
property.

Also, the Plaintiff-Respondent acquired its interest in the property

from Pouches, Inc., the party against whom the Defendant-Appellant made a
binding election. Therefore, the Plaintiff-Respondent is entitled to the benefit
of the election made, and the Defendant-Appellant is precluded from asserting
a claim for a new remedy in the present case.

12
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POINT IV
THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT HOLDS A
PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST IN THE
PROPERTY OF POUCHES, INC.

The Defendant-Appellant raises an issue as to whether or not the PlaintiffRespondent has a purchase money security interest or just a perfected security
interest in the property of Pouches, Inc.

Pouches, Inc. represented to Plaintiff-

Respondent that the security interest granted in the property would be a
purchase money security interest. (R.35)

The parties in this action did not

stipulate to the conclusiveness of the representation of Pouches, Inc. and
therefore Plaintiff-Respondent only claimed to have a perfected security
interest in the property of Pouches, Inc. (R.90-91)

On appeal, Plaintiff-

Respondent again makes no greater claim than being a secured party lender
and not a purchase money lender.

In light of the points discussed previously

in this brief there is no need. for the Court to make a determination as to
whether the Plaintiff-Respondent was a purchase money lender.

CONCLUSION

The trial court did not err in finding the perfected security interest of
the Plaintiff-Respondent prior to the Defendant-Appellant's statutory lessor's
lien because the priority was established by the lessor's lien statute.
The trial court did not err in rejecting Defendant-Appellant's efforts to
construct, after-the-fact, a security interest in the personal property of
Pouches, Inc. because the Defendant-Appellant's claim was not supported by
the language of the lease agreement or the conduct of the Defendant-Appellant.
Even if the Defendant-Appellant were allowed to claim a security interest
13
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in the property of Pouches, Inc. its claim to priority is barred by its electic
to obtain judgment against Pouches, Inc. on the statutory lessor's lien.
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of March, 1982.

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby declare that I hand-delivered two true and correct copies of th
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